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Abstract 
This Article amends an important theory by Mark Grady on nondurable 
precaution (Grady, 1988). We present a formal model on (non)durable 
precautions which focuses on memory costs, and add three insights to the 
literature. First, we argue that, under current tort doctrine, the interaction 
between nondurable precautions and mental costs create a self-sustaining 
expansion of tort law. Because the risk of liability creates additional 
interference effects, tort law perpetuates the expansion of awards. Second, 
we demonstrate that socially excessive suits are more likely to be filed in 
the event of nondurable technology. This is because a plaintiff does not 
consider the increase of interference costs as a private cost, when initiating 
a lawsuit. Third, while new harm-reducing technology likely increases 
accident rates, it also raises the ratio of trial costs to harm, thus leaving 
undetermined the overall effect of new technology on the rate of litigation. 
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1      Introduction 
 
What explains the expansion of tort awards? One possible answer is that 
advancements in technology have increased the scope of tort liability. 
Technological progress removes risk from nature and places it in the control of 
man, inducing additional tort liabilities.1 According to the economic theory of 
tort law, an increase in potential liability costs induces potential tortfeasors to 
implement additional efforts to avoid liability.2 Some have held that this causes 
society to engage in excessive levels of precaution in regard to defensive 
medicine3 and products liability.4 At the same time, however, there has been an 
alleged expansion of the tort system over time, with rising remedies, awards, 
and insurance premiums.5 How can both phenomena of (incentives for) 
excessive precaution and a tort explosion co-exist? Where is the rub? 
This Article examines the impact of technology on the evolution of tort 
awards. In doing so, we rely on Mark Grady‟s important, yet often overlooked 
article, in which he distinguishes between various types of precautions created 
by technology (1988).6 Certain technology prescribes one-time investments in 
precaution (durable acts of precaution), while other technological advancements 
require precautionary measures that involve multiple acts of foreseeing, 
complying, or remembering (nondurable acts of precaution). 7  
Generally speaking, technology increases the scope of liability exposure. 
However, by transferring risk from nature to mankind, durable and nondurable 
technologies have differential effects on liability. Nondurable precaution creates 
a higher potential of liability exposure because a wider margin of human error 
exists. Moreover, because tort doctrine does not excuse error and mistakes, tort 
law effectively creates “pockets of strict liability” in the heart of negligence law 
(Shavell, 1987; Grady, 1988).  
                                                 
1 For instance, novel medical technologies create new opportunities for errors and increase 
the expectations of medical performance, further widening the scope of negligence. 
2 In a negligence based system, market forces and insurance premiums encourage potential 
injurers to take further precautions as long as the lower expected liability costs outweigh the 
cost of the respective extra precautions. 
3 Take, for example, the renewed appeal of more invasive but less risky medical procedures, 
such as caesarian birth deliveries; see generally Kessler & McClellan, 1997 (arguing that the 
professional conduct of physicians is largely a function of prevailing tort law in the state in 
which they practice). 
4 Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, U.S. Tort Costs: 2000: Trends and Findings on the Costs of the 
U.S. Tort System 12 (2002). 
5 In some areas of law, such as medical malpractice, commentators speak of a malpractice 
explosion. See Danzon, 1985: 142-43. For a public choice explanation of the growth of tort law 
see Zywicki, 2001. 
6 One notable exception is Heald, 1993 (discussing the role of cognitive scripts in processing 
task management). 
7 Also, in order for durable precaution measures to be effective, they often are to be 
combined with many short lived (nondurable) acts of precaution. For instance, once a dialysis 
machine is purchased, it has a long service life; however, once the machine is installed, it 
needs to be properly connected to the patient, the machine and the interaction with the patient 
must be tested, progress needs to be regularly monitored, the machine needs to be maintained, 
etc.  
3 
 
In this Article we provide a formal model, which demonstrates that the use of 
nondurable precaution technology is more likely to result in an accident than 
the use of durable technology. The differential effect of durable and nondurable 
technology on negligence is attributed to the higher compliance costs associated 
with the former.8 This result confirms the theory suggested by Grady (1988) 
and provides insight into the role that technology plays in the evolution of tort 
awards. Although we may expect tort law to provide incentives to invest in 
safer technology – encouraging innovation in durable precaution technology 
over nondurable types – the effectiveness of such incentives depends largely on 
innovation cycles. We posit that tort awards will increase whenever 
technological progress is not able to substitute nondurable with durable 
technologies. 
An essential characteristic of nondurable precaution technology is a high 
degree of multi-tasking. As a growing body of studies on cognitive control 
suggests, multi-tasking involves considerable memory costs and complications, 
including the occurrence of interference effects between various tasks. From 
these findings, it appears that compliance costs for nondurable precautions are 
higher than previously assumed. This provides additional grounds for 
anticipating a high number of negligence cases arising out of nondurable 
precautions. By contrast, the relative simplicity of precaution measures 
associated with durable technology creates a lower potential for negligence. 
Even if negligence is found with regard to a durable precaution technology, 
interference effects from liability costs will be modest due to the low degree of 
multitasking involved.  
Given the existence of interference effects, we argue that, tort litigation 
imposes at least two additional costs that are unique to nondurable precaution 
technology. First, the fear of litigation adds a layer of potential interference for 
nondurable precautions. For instance, if a doctor‟s concern of medical 
malpractice forces her to check up on a dialysis machine every ten minutes, it 
will become harder for her to remember to check up on another machine that 
must be monitored regularly. In this regard, the tort system imposes additional 
mental costs that interfere with existing processing tasks. Due to additional 
interference effects, tort litigation may generate a self-sustaining effect on tort 
awards for errors involving nondurable precautions. Second, as we illustrate 
formally in this paper, nondurable technology is more likely to induce socially 
excessive litigation. This results because plaintiffs do not consider the increase 
of prevention costs of other activities created by litigation as a private cost. By 
contrast, due to lower degrees of interference effects, durable precaution 
technology poses a lesser risk of socially excessive litigation.  
When new technology brings about a significant reduction in accident costs, 
the savings that result may, in fact, spawn an increase in the number of 
accidents. As we demonstrate more formally below, reduced accident costs may 
decrease the amount invested in precaution, which will thus lead to more 
instances of negligence. Additionally, following a reduction in the average 
amount of harm per accident, due to new harm-reducing technologies, comes an 
increase in the ratio of trial costs to harm. Therefore, the overall impact of new 
                                                 
8 This difference is amplified by the unwillingness of courts to consider memory costs as a 
defense to negligence (Grady, 1998: 295). 
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technology on litigation rates is ambiguous as the increase of accidents may be 
offset by the fact that many new suits may have negative expected values. 
The influence of nondurable precautions on the expansion of tort law reflects 
poorly on the legal and economic theories surrounding tort law. To date, law 
and economics scholars have focused almost exclusively on economic decisions 
involving durable precautions.9 Most tort accidents, however, involve situations 
where mishaps result because of mistakes, safety omissions, or split second 
errors; i.e. situations where prevention measures had to be repeated and 
remembered (nondurable precautions), rather than instances requiring a 
single, isolated measure to be taken (durable precautions). By neglecting to 
account for the difference between durable and nondurable precautions, 
economic theory has commonly failed to analyze some of the elements that are 
crucial in determining tort awards.10 Yet, as discussed below, understanding 
the effects of nondurable precaution is crucial to understanding the evolution of 
tort law. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a formal model to 
demonstrate the differing effects of durable and nondurable technologies on 
accident rates. Section 3.1 updates the model with relevant insights from the 
literature on cognitive psychology regarding mental costs and interference 
effects. Section 3.2 formalizes and discusses the gap between social and private 
incentives to sue over accidents involving nondurable precaution technology. 
Section 3.3 considers the impact of harm-reducing technology on the rate of 
accidents and litigation.  Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2      Durable and Nondurable Precaution: General Model 
 
This Section models the different effects durable and nondurable technologies 
have on accident rates. Consider the following basic model of negligence-based 
liability.  
The private cost function of the injurer under the rule of negligence is given 
as: 








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 x x if if ,)(
 x x if ,
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9 As Grady (1998) observes, virtually all classic economic inquiries of tort law examine whether 
an injurer should, from a cost-benefit perspective, have engaged in a unique act of prevention. 
Classic examples include installing a spark arrester (Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1972), and renting 
a barge (Landes & Posner, 1987, pp. 85-86). Cited in Grady, 1998: 301.   
10
 In an interesting article, Nussim and Tabbach (2009) take into consideration the differences 
between durable and nondurable precaution.  In their conception, precautionary measures are 
durable in nature when they are effective or endure for all (or at least more than one) activity 
level, and certainly need not be taken per unit of activity (Nussim & Tabbach, 2009). The focus 
of this article is different than theirs. They show that, for an important set of cases, care and 
activity levels are complements and that this leads to several counter-intuitive results. Our 
model focuses directly on the (or a) source of the durable-nondurable division (memory costs) 
and examines some consequences of the presence of such costs (e.g. on the social versus the 
private incentive to sue).  
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where  x = the level of precaution,  p(x) = the probability of an accident when 
precaution x is taken (with p‟ < 0 and p” >0), and H = the harm if an accident 
occurs.  
 
The social cost function is: 
HxpxxSC  )()(        (2) 
To find the optimal amount of precaution
x , we minimize SC(x), so that 
0)(  xCS  
 
Injurers take the optimal amount of precaution under the rule of negligence 
(when due care is equal to optimal care). If injurers engage in lower levels of 
precaution, they will bear the full social costs of the accident (Dari-Mattiacci & 
Parisi, 2005).  
 
2.1   Nondurable Precaution: The Effect of Memory Costs 
    
Next we consider the differences between durable and nondurable precaution 
technology by explicitly considering memory investments as a part of compliance 
costs.
11
  
We formalize accidents involving nondurable precautions as follows: during 
time period T, there is an expected number of N 'critical moments', where harm 
H may occur. For example, a nurse needs to check on a machine 500 times; if 
she forgets to check the machine, harm may occur. In time period T-1, the 
potential injurer must decide how much she will invest in developing memory; 
this investment level determines the percentage of cases in which she will 
forget/remember to take precaution. If, for example, the nurse practices 3 hours 
per year, she will remember to check the machine 98% of the time, or 490 out of 
500 instances; if she practices 4 hours per year she will remember to check the 
machine 99% of the time, or 495 out of 500 occasions. 
The private cost function of the injurer under the rule of negligence (the 
injurer is liable for damages every time he forgets to take precaution and harm 
occurs) is given as:  
   HpcRNxcRNccPC ndndndndndndnd  )0(1*)()(  
   (3) 
where cnd = the level of investment in memory, Rnd(c) = the probability that 
the potential injurer will remember to take precaution, with 
0 and 0  ndRndR  . 
When the injurer makes an investment cnd in memory, he will remember to 
take precaution with probability Rnd(cnd)) for any critical moment (there are N 
                                                 
11 The cost of remembering to use precautions is the main element of compliance 
costs, see Grady (1988). Another type of compliance cost is the cost of noticing risk 
every time. However, as Grady (1988) notes, this cost may be a corollary of memory 
costs. If someone didn‟t notice risk, it is frequently because he has forgotten to take 
the precaution of looking for it.   
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in total). The potential injurer will take optimal care x* when he remembers to 
take precaution. With probability 1-Rnd(cnd), he will forget to take precaution for 
any critical moment. In that case, there is a chance of p(0) that harm H will 
occur, for which the injurer will be liable.      
To find the amount that the injurer will invest in memory, we minimize his 
private cost function. The injurer chooses cnd so that: 
 
   
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
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0/1'
10*'
00).('.'1
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  (4) 
In order to illustrate the effect of memory costs, consider the following 
numerical example. A nurse can spend 4 hours each year on training with a 
new machine. The cost of training is $5,000 per 4 hour session. If the nurse 
follows this training course, there is a 99% probability that he will remember 
how to use the machine properly. On the other hand, if the nurse elects to 
spend 20 hours each year on training, he will remember how to use the 
machine properly with complete certainty (100%), however, the cost of which 
will amount to $25,000. There are 500 critical moments and the cost of 
precaution equals $100. If no precaution is taken at all, there is a 2% chance of 
harm. Harm equals $10,000. Will the nurse make the additional investment so 
that he will always remember to use the machine properly?  If the nurse spends 
4 hours, his total expected costs equal $5,000 + 0.99 x 500 x $100 + 0.01 x 0.02 
x 500 x $100,000 = $64,500. If the nurse spends 20 hours in training, his total 
expected costs equal $25,000 + 1 x 500 x $100 = $75.000. In this example, the 
nurse will select a memory accurateness of 99% instead of 100%. Next we turn 
to the case of durable precaution. 
 
2.2   Durable Precaution 
We formalize accidents involving durable precautions as follows: during time 
period T, there is an expected number of critical moments N. In time period T – 
1 the potential injurer has to decide how much to invest in memory so that he 
will remember to take the durable precaution just before period T begins. The 
durable precaution will prevent damage for N critical moments in time period 
T.12 A durable precaution requires the potential injurer to make an investment 
in memory for one single precautionary measure that takes place just before 
time period T; while a nondurable precaution requires that the investment 
cover several precautions that take place during time period T. Consider the 
following hypothetical example. A doctor must purchase the newest state-of-
the-art dialysis machine for the upcoming year, and must remember to order it 
                                                 
12 For simplicity and clarity we assume that these measures of durable precaution do not 
need to be supplemented with nondurable ones. 
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ahead of time.13 The doctor therefore needs to make a memory investment to 
ensure that he will order the machine ahead of time, for instance, before year‟s 
end. Note that we simplified this example by stating that the injurer must take 
the precaution just before time period T, and that it is no longer possible to do 
so during time period T.  
The private cost function of the injurer under a rule of negligence is14:  
        HpcRNycRccPC ddddddd 
 01)(                                 (5) 
 
where cd = the level of investment in memory, Rd(c) = the probability that the 
potential injurer will remember to take precaution, with 
0 and 0  dRdR  . 
 
When the injurer makes an investment cd in memory, he will remember to 
take precaution with the probability Rd(cd). The potential tortfeasor will take 
optimal care y* when he remembers to take precaution. With probability 1-
Rd(cd), he will forget to take precaution. In that case, for every critical moment 
(there are N in total) there is a chance of p(0) that harm H will occur for which 
the injurer will have to pay the injured. 
Again, the potential injurer will choose a level of investment in memory that 
minimizes his private cost function:  
      
     

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
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2.3   Comparing durable and nondurable precaution  
 
For durable precautions, we obtain the optimal level of investment in 
memory cd* from: 
     yHpNcdR d 0/1      
   
 
For nondurable precautions, we obtain the optimal level of investment in 
memory cnd* from: 
     xNHpNcdRn nd 0/1  
                                                 
13 Such a dead line could exist, for instance, because the doctor‟s office is updating the 
computer system on the first day of the following year, and their current dialysis machine is 
incompatible and therefore must be purchased before the date. 
14 It follows from the classic model of negligence that the injurer will take optimal 
precaution when he remembers he has to take precaution.  
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We will now compare the optimal levels of investment in memory for durable and 
nondurable precautions for three situations: (1) 
 xN  = y , (2)  xN  > y  and 
(3) 
 xN  < y . We will assume that    cRndcRd   and that 
   cRndcRd ''   for all c.  These assumptions are likely to hold in many instances 
(see however section 2.4.4). Generally, it’s easier (less costly) to remember something 
once, with a certain probability, than it is to remember it several times with the same 
probability. Also, it’s easier (less costly) to remember something in the near future than 
it is to remember something in the future that is further away. An additional 
investment in memory will often have a larger effect for durable precautions than for 
nondurable ones, at any given level of current investment. 
 
    
2.3.1. The total costs of prevention, short of the investments in memory, are the 
same (
 xN  = y ) 
 
  
Now         
    
       



yHpNxNHpNcdRn
yHpNcdR
nd
d
0/10/1
0/1
*
*
 (7)  
 
      Thus    ** '' ndd cRndcRd   
Given that 0'R , 0"R and    cRndcRd ''   for all c, it follows that 
*cndcd  . 
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Because the level of investment in memory is higher for durable than it is for 
nondurable precaution (and given that    cRndcRd  ), remembering to take 
durable precaution is more likely accomplished than remembering to take 
nondurable precaution.  
 
 
2.3.2. The total costs of prevention, short of the investments in memory, are 
larger for nondurable precautions than for durable precautions (
 xN  > y ). 
 
   When 
 xN  > y , then    ** '' ndd cRndcRd  . Consequently, the level of 
investment in memory and the probability of remembering to take nondurable 
precautions is even smaller than in the previous case and thus smaller than for 
durable precautions (holding y* constant). The intuition behind this is simple: 
the costs that need to be made in case one remembers to take care become 
larger for nondurable precautions. It thus becomes less worthwile to remember 
to take care.  
 
 
c 
Rd(cd) 
Rnd(cnd) 
*
ndc  
*
dc  
)( *dcRd  
 
)( *ndcRnd
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2.3.3. The total costs of prevention, short of the investments in memory, are 
smaller for nondurable precautions than for durable precautions (
 xN  < 
y ).15 
 
   When 
 xN  < y , then    ** '' ndd cRndcRd  . Consequently, the level of 
investment in memory and the probability of remembering to take nondurable 
precautions is larger than in the case in which 
 xN  = y  (holding y* 
constant). The level of investment and the probability of remembering can 
either be larger or smaller for nondurable precautions than for durable ones. 
The figure below is limited to only one of these situations: the investment in 
precaution is larger for nondurable precautions, but the probability of 
remembering is still lower.   
 
                                                 
15 Note that if repeating a task leads to habit formation then the cost of 
performing the task can come down with time. In other words, there could 
be a negative relationship between N and the costs of precaution: as N 
increases, the costs of precaution may decrease.  
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2.4   Discussion and extensions 
 
 
2.4.1. General 
 
The model above shows that under several conditions the level of investment in 
memory will be higher for durable than for nondurable precaution; i.e. 
remembering to take durable precaution is more likely than remembering to 
take nondurable precaution. As a result, there will be more cases of negligence 
involving nondurable precautions than durable precautions.16 Because, by 
                                                 
16 Note that we have proven that there will be less negligence for durable precautions even 
under the worst-case scenario (the injurer has to remember to take his durable precaution just 
before period T starts). In reality, the injurer will often have a large amount of time during 
which he can remember to take his precaution (e.g. if he forgets on Monday, there is still a 
chance on Tuesday; if he forgets on Tuesday, there is still a chance on Wednesday, etc.). This 
means that for durable precautions, the injurer can remember to take precaution with almost 
certainty, by investing a very small amount in memory. In that sense, the model for durable 
precaution would resemble the classic model of negligence very well. Nondurable and durable 
c 
Rd(cd) 
Rnd(cnd) 
*
ndc  
(Nx*=y*) 
*
dc   
(Nx*=y*) 
)( *dcRd  
(Nx*=y*) 
*)*(
*
yNx
cnd
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)( *dcRnd  
(Nx*=y*) 
)( *dcRnd  
(Nx*<y*) 
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comparison, durable prevention technology has a relatively lower potential for 
liability from human error, the tort system encourages innovation17 in durable 
precaution technology.18  
But there are limits on the amount of direction that the tort system can 
impose on technological progress. First, some injurers do not have an economic 
incentive to invest in safety; either because there is no adequate reward or 
because they have rendered themselves immune from sanctions.19 Second, and 
more fundamentally, technological innovation is only partially susceptible to 
external influence. Although it is widely recognized that market forces help 
shape the course of innovation,20 scholars recognize that innovation also runs 
an independent course. Evidence in support of the theory of technological 
opportunity21 suggests that markets often follow innovations, and not vice 
versa.22 Accordingly, the tort system only has a limited ability to effectuate 
changes between durable and nondurable technologies.  
This insight generates the following hypothesis regarding the interaction 
between the tort system and innovation: damage awards will accumulate at 
times when innovation introduces new risk-transferring technologies in the 
form of nondurable precautions, rather than durable precautions. In this sense, 
“tort explosions” may occur whenever innovation lags behind the demand of the 
tort system to create durable technology; i.e. tort awards trace the non-
availability of some types of innovation (durable) after a more primitive 
innovation (nondurable) has transferred risk from nature to the (imperfect) 
control of man. This argument is to be contrasted with traditional theories of 
technological lag, which assign liability to the actor(s) responsible for not 
implementing readily available technologies that would have been safer and 
more effective under the circumstances.23  
 
 
 
2.4.2. The choice between durable and nondurable precautions 
 
   In this section, we examine the choice by the potential injurer between 
durable and nondurable care technology. If the potential injurer decides to use 
nondurable care technology, his expected pay-off equals: 
    
 
   HpcRNxcRNccPC ndndndndndndnd  )0(1*)()( ****  
                                                                                                                       
precautions can thus be described, respectively, as memory-intensive and non-memory-
intensive precautions. 
17 See Sage: “innovation that improves safety often happens in the shadow of liability.” (cited 
in Hyman & Silver, 2005). 
18 In effect, by not forgiving human errors, which are more frequent when precaution 
technology involves nondurable compliance, courts encourage innovation in durable 
technologies. Grady, 1998: 302-310.  
19 On the former, see Hyman & Silver, 2005. On issues of judgment proof tortfeasors, see 
Lopucki, 1998. 
20 On the so-called market pull theory, see Schmookler, 1962. 
21 Schumpeter, 1934; Scherer, 1982. 
22 For a review of empirical studies, see Astebro & Dahlin, 2005. 
23 Grady,1988: 298 (with reference to Danzon, 1985)  
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   If the potential injurer decides to use durable care technology, his expected 
pay-off equals: 
 
       HpcRNycRccPC ddddddd   01)( ****  
 
 
   A potential injurer will prefer to use durable over nondurable precaution 
technology if: 
 
 
       HpcRNycRc ddddd   01 *** < 
   HpcRNxcRNc ndndndndnd  )0(1*)( ***  
 
 
    If Nx*=y* or Nx*>y*, the total costs are always larger for nondurable 
precautions than for durable ones. We can see this as follows:  
 
       HpcRNycRc ddddd   01 *** = 
    HpNyHpNcRc ddd   0)).0(.(** < 
    HpNyHpNcRc nddd   0)).0(.(** <
    HpNyHpNcRc ndndd   0)).0(.(** ≤ 
    HpNxNHpNcRc ndndd  0*).).0(.(** = 
   HpcRNxcRNc ndndndndnd  )0(1*)( ***  
 
 
   Note that there are several reasons why a potential injurer may decide to 
switch from nondurable to durable precaution technology. For example, the 
costs of remembering to take nondurable precaution may rise, for instance 
because of interference effects (see further). Also, the costs of nondurable 
precautions (x*) may increase, or the costs of durable precautions (y* ) may 
decrease.24  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Many risk-dumping technologies are probably used on a large scale after their 
(often) initial high costs have dropped.  As an example of risk-dumping technology, 
Grady (1988) mentions a buzzer in an aircraft that sounds when the pilot attempts 
a landing with the gear detracted, which reduces the losses from failures to 
maintain high compliance rates for nondurable precautions (manually checking 
gear status).   
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2.4.3. Activity levels  
 
   We have seen that the probability of remembering to take nondurable 
precautions is unambiguously smaller than the probability of remembering to 
take durable precautions when Nx*=y* or when Nx*>y*. Under these 
conditions, we should see more accidents when care is nondurable, given 
constant activity levels. However, the type of precaution (durable or 
nondurable) can influence the activity levels of potential tortfeasors. In the 
previous section, we have seen that when Nx*=y* or Nx*>y*, the total costs are 
always larger for nondurable precautions than for durable ones. The reason is 
of course that nondurable precautions have a disadvantage compared to 
durable precautions
25
 (but see the next section). The consequence is that activity 
levels will be lower for nondurable precautions, and this reduces the total number of 
accidents.
26
 As Grady (1988) notes, “when people realize that their reasonable memory 
lapses will also yield a legal penalty, it encourages them to avoid low-value activities”. 
 
 
 
2.4.4. Relaxing the assumption that    cRndcRd    
   Repeating a task again and again may lead to greater familiarity with that 
task. In some situations, this could lead to a greater probability of remembering 
to take nondurable precautions than durable ones (for an identical level of 
investment).27 More formally, it could be the case that    cRndcRd  . This 
could reverse some findings of the previous sections. 
 
 
 
 
3      Technology & Tort Litigation 
 
In this section we expand our basic model by including an analysis of the 
impact that technology has on the rate of tort litigation. First, we broaden the 
analysis by taking into account the existence of interference effects that occur 
when various cognitive tasks are combined (Section 3.1). Second, we compare 
the social costs of litigation in the context of nondurable versus durable 
precaution technology (Section 3.2). Finally, we consider the impact of harm-
reducing technology on the rate of accidents and litigation (Section 3.3).  
                                                 
25
 For any level of investment c, the probability of remembering is larger for durable 
precautions. When Nx*>y*, there are two disadvantages. 
26 When Nx*<y*, activity levels could be either smaller or larger under nondurable 
precautions than under durable ones. In this case, nondurable precautions have one 
advantage and one disadvantage compared to durable precautions.  
27 This could especially be the case if there‟s some feedback after each “critical 
moment” (or at least after some of these moments) when precaution is nondurable 
and if durable precautions can only be purchased, installed etc. at some limited 
points in time (so that any feedback effect for durable precautions would not have a 
direct effect).  
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3.1   Multitasking and Interference Effects  
 
An essential characteristic of nondurable precaution technology is a high degree 
of multi-tasking. Nondurable precaution technologies often set out a number of 
tasks, and also commonly prescribe a specific sequence and/or timing of 
compliance measures.  
A growing body of studies in cognitive science suggests that the costs of 
simultaneously processing different tasks are higher than typically assumed. 
For instance, studies on executive control document how individuals‟ reaction 
times are substantially slower and, usually, more prone to error when tasks are 
changed.28 In the literature on cognitive control, such switch costs are 
attributed to the use of distinct components in the control processes of task-
setting,29 and to the occurrence of interference effects between the various 
tasks,30 also known as dual task interference.31 
These findings further suggest that the multitasking aspects of nondurable 
precaution will impose higher prevention costs.32 Because interference effects 
exist between various measures of nondurable precaution, the costs of 
nondurable precautions in the defendants‟ other activities will rise due to the 
efforts required by the first task. For example, if a new dialysis machine 
requires  a doctor to check up on it every ten minutes, it will become harder for 
her to remember to check up on another machine that also requires regular 
monitoring. The memory costs involved in remembering to check the first 
machine increase because the doctor needs to check the second machine as well. 
As such, interference effects increase overall potential liability.33 By contrast 
however, liability from interference effects involving durable precaution 
technology will be more modest because of the low degree of multitasking 
                                                 
28 Interestingly, the costs from alternating tasks are reduced but not removed when 
individuals are given an opportunity to prepare (residual costs). 
29 Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer and Evans, 2001. 
30 Meuter & Allport, 1999.  See also on inhibition effects Allport & Wylie, 1999. 
31 For a review, see Monsell, 2003. But see Heald (1993) on the process of "scripting". If a 
series of tasks are simply repeated over time, individuals develop cognitive patterns (so-called 
scripts) that significantly reduce the costs of remembering what is “scripted” (performance 
occurs in a semi-automatic fashion). Even though total memory costs are high (requiring an 
ex-ante investment), the marginal costs for nondurable precautions are almost zero once the 
script is in place. While we do not disagree with this finding, there are at least two reasons to 
assume that compliance costs of nondurable precautions are non-negligible even when 
considering the benevolent effects of scripting. First, findings in cognitive science demonstrate 
that memory costs are high whenever multi-tasking involves some amount of switching. The 
effect of scripting will be limited mostly to instances where little or no (ad hoc) alterations are 
required in the sequence or list of tasks. Second, in industries that have a high rate of 
innovation, the long run effects of scripting will be rather modest, given the regular 
introduction of new technologies and processes.  
32 Multitasking "requires capacities over and above the capacities required for the individual 
tasks". Miller, 1900, at p. 234. 
33 Note that with variable activity levels, the potential injurer may be induced to 
decrease his activity level when the interference among various tasks increases. 
This will reduce the number of accidents.  
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involved.34 If a doctor simply needs to turn a machine on once, the costs of 
turning on another machine remain relatively static. This is because the 
durable act of turning a machine on is not as memory-intensive vis-à-vis 
regular monitoring. 
 
 
3.2   Social and Private Costs of Litigation 
 
If we consider interference effects as a major part of the compliance costs 
associated with nondurable precaution technology, tort litigation imposes two 
additional costs. 
First, the potential for liability itself may generate an additional layer of 
interference. That is, the fear of litigation may exasperate interference effects 
and, consequently, induce more errors involving nondurable precaution. For 
instance, if a concern for medical malpractice forces a doctor to check up on a 
dialysis machine every ten minutes, it will become harder for her to remember 
to check up on another machine that must be monitored regularly. In this 
regard, the tort system imposes additional mental costs that interfere with 
existing processing tasks. Potential defendants become more cautious when 
completing a given task after tort liability has introduced a potential negligence 
claim toward that activity.    
According to some commentators, tort law may increase mistakes and errors. 
For instance, in the field of medical malpractice, liability costs discourage error 
reporting and service improvements.35 Interference effects provide a novel 
account of the correlation between liability and medical error: the fear of a 
lawsuit alone might induce additional mistakes. When rising liability costs 
increase cognitive costs and interference effects, compliance costs increase. 
Additional errors and mistakes will then give rise to added liabilities and will 
further sustain the initial interference effect imposed by the fear of liability. By 
contrast, litigation on durable precautions has a lower potential for interference 
effects due to the relative simplicity of durable precaution technologies. Even if 
liability is common with regard to a durable precaution, interference effects 
from potential liability will be modest because of the low degree of multitasking 
involved. 
Second, multitasking and interference effects may increase the gap between 
the social and private costs of litigation. When considering the private costs of a 
lawsuit,  a plaintiff does not consider the increase of prevention costs of other 
activities, as created by litigation. There thus may be too many lawsuits filed 
involving accidents.36 As we illustrate more formally below, nondurable 
technology is more likely to induce socially excessive litigation than durable 
                                                 
34 For instance, there is evidence that switching costs are substantial, even (and especially) 
when a switch is made to an easier task. See Allport & Wylie, 1999. 
35 For a review of this argument, and theoretical and empirical evidence to the contrary, see 
Hyman & Silver, 2005. 
36 Note that there may be a gap between the social and private costs of litigation, 
even if there is no interference cost. The memory cost itself is sufficient for the 
divergence between the social and private costs of litigation. 
17 
 
technology.37 The potential for socially excessive litigation is higher with regard 
to nondurable precaution technology because of the additional multitasking and 
interference effects. By contrast, because of the lower degree of multitasking, 
durable precaution technology poses less risk of socially excessive litigation.  
To illustrate this point, consider the following formal exposition. Under the 
classic model of negligence, there are no social costs of suing because injurers 
always take due care and consequently, victims never file; i.e. deterrence is 
achieved at no cost. When memory costs are considered, suing becomes possible 
under a negligence regime (see our model above in Section 2). We adopt 
Shavell‟s classic model (1982) on the difference between private and social 
incentives to sue, as follows: 
The victim will sue if, and only if, Cp < H.  
Suing becomes socially optimal when:38  
 
[1 – R(c)] . p(0) . (Cp + Cd + Cs) + c + R(c) . x + MOA (c)   (8) 
<  [p(0) - [R(c) . p(x) + (1 – R(c)) . p(0)] ] . H 
 
where c denotes the investment in memory and x denotes the precaution 
expenditures that injurers will be induced to take if a suit is brought. 
The left-hand side of the inequality represents the social cost of suing. It is 
necessary to distinguish between four terms. The first term, [1 – R(c)] . p(0) . 
(Cp + Cd + Cs), represents the expected litigation costs of the parties and the 
State. The second term, c, equals the memory investment of the injurer. The 
third term, R(c).x, equals the cost of precaution, multiplied with the probability 
that the injurer will remember to take precaution. The last term, MOA (c), 
represents the increase in memory costs, as created by the interference effects 
that are associated with the injurer‟s other activities.   
The right-hand side of the inequality represents the social benefit of suing. 
The probability that harm will occur when the injurer invests c in memory and 
takes precaution x (instead of nothing) drops from p(0) to R(c) . p(x) + (1 – R(c)) . 
p(0): for an investment c, the injurer remembers to take precaution x with 
probability R(c), in which case harm will occur with probability p(x); the injurer 
forgets to take precaution with probability 1-R(c), in which case harm will occur 
with probability p(0).  
Holding everything else equal, an increase in c raises the memory-
intensiveness of precautions. There are at least two reasons why suits will be 
socially less optimal when c rises. First, it becomes relatively more expensive to 
remember to take precautions. Second, a higher c leads to additional 
interference effects in relation to the other activities of the injurer. In other 
words, as c increases, the precaution costs of the injurer‟s other activities 
increase as well.   
                                                 
37 In the standard economic model, socially undesirable levels of litigation may occur when 
there is a gap between private and social incentives to sue (Shavell, 1982). Because a plaintiff 
does not take into account the deterrent effect of a lawsuit on the behavior of injurers, she will 
initiate too many or too few suits. When the private gains of litigation are larger than the 
social benefits, there will be a tendency towards excessive suits. When the social benefits are 
larger than the private gains, a socially inadequate amount of suits, for the purpose of 
deterrence, will be initiated. 
38
 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is only one critical moment (N=1). 
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Litigation over failed acts of nondurable precaution will lead to higher social 
costs involving nondurable precaution technologies than durable ones. This 
holds true even if durable and nondurable precautions are equally costly and 
equally capable of reducing the probability of an accident. This point ties into 
the ongoing debate over socially excessive litigation where, according to some, 
high rates of litigation are causing defensive medicine, higher professional 
insurance fees, and an increase in costs of the health care system.39 The 
distinction between durable and nondurable technology provides a novel way to 
approach this argument. Interference effects arising out of nondurable 
technologies might induce additional claims, resembling a self-sustaining effect 
on liability, without providing countervailing public benefits.  
 
 
3.3   Harm Reducing Technology and Litigation Rates 
 
Aside from preventing accidents, technology may also bring about significant 
reductions in the costs of those accidents that do occur. For instance, an 
advancement in injury treatment technology may substantially reduce the costs 
of harm H in the event of an accident. Ironically, such a cost savings in 
accidents may lead to an increase in the number of accidents, especially those 
involving nondurable technology. For instance, new technology that 
substantially reduces the harm caused by car accidents, may lead to lower 
levels of safe driving.40  
Consider this point in the context of our model above. Intuitively, when the 
consequences of being held liable become less severe, conditions may become 
optimal for a potential injurer to invest less in remembering to take 
precautions. More formally, the net benefit of remembering to take precaution, 
p(0).H – x*, may become smaller when H becomes smaller.41Formally, the net 
benefit of remembering to take precaution equals p(0).H - x* (which is always 
positive). We can see that p(0).H - x* increases with a rise in the level of harm 
H (and decreases when H falls), because p(0).H is an increasing and linear 
function, while x*(H) is an increasing but concave function: dx*/dH > 0 and 
d²x*/dH² < 0.42 In other words, when harm H decreases, there can be more 
negligence.  
                                                 
39 For a review, see Danzon, 1995. 
40 Note that this is different from the general argument that new technology may increase 
negligence because of the higher availability of harm reducing technology (e.g., a doctor may 
forget to use an antiseptic that was previously unavailable). Grady, 1988.  
41
 This is the case if p(0) < x*’(H).  
42
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It is important to note that, although there may be more instances of 
negligence, new harm-reducing technology does not necessarily induce higher 
levels of tort litigation. Because such technology reduces the average amount of 
harm per accident, the ratio of trial costs to harm increases. Hence, an increase 
in accidents may be accompanied by a relative reduction in litigation, caused by 
the higher level of lawsuits with negative expected values. 
  
 
 
4      Conclusions  
 
Technological progress transfers risks by taking them out of nature and 
putting them into the hands of man. Such man-made control is relatively 
straightforward when technology prescribes one-time investments in precaution 
(durable precautions). However, complexity can arise in regard to other 
precaution measures, for which technology imposes multiple acts of foreseeing, 
complying, and/or remembering on the part of the potential injurer (nondurable 
precautions).  
We provided a formal model demonstrating that accidents involving 
nondurable technology occur more frequently than those involving durable 
technology.43 Moreover, the interference effects created by nondurable 
technology may induce additional claims, thus creating a self-sustaining effect 
on liability (Section 3.1) without any countervailing public benefits (Section 
3.2). 
The lack of attention paid to nondurable precautions in economic theories of 
tort law is in line with the courts‟ refusal to consider the increased compliance 
costs imposed by new technology. With only a handful of exceptions,44 American 
courts have refused to excuse mistakes, confusion, and inadvertence when 
considering negligence in accidents (Grady, 1994). Of course, allowing such 
defenses would impose unreasonably high information costs on courts (everyone 
could argue that they “forgot” to take precaution) and also would, arguably, 
reduce the incentives to invest in durable precaution technology (Grady, 1988; 
Shavell, 2008). Yet, the reluctance of courts to consider the compliance costs 
resulting from nondurable technologies may well affect the evolution of tort 
awards. It is likely that we will see a rise in tort awards whenever technological 
progress is unable to substitute nondurable with durable technologies. Such 
liability pressure is likely to be valuable when the benefits of moving to durable 
technology can be achieved at low costs, or when there are significant accident 
costs stemming from nondurable technologies. On the other hand, whenever 
innovation is inelastic, tort-based incentives for innovation increase the costs of 
the tort system without providing countervailing benefits.  
 
 
                                                 
43 Except in some situations in which the total costs of prevention, short of the 
investments in memory, are smaller for nondurable precautions than for durable 
precautions.  
44 See, e.g., Wittman, 1981. 
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